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Spontaneity and Materiality: 
What Photography is in the Photography of James Welling 
Diarmuid Costello and Dominic McIver Lopes 
 
 
Images are double agents. They receive information from the 
world, while also projecting visual imagination onto the world. 
As a result, mind and world tug our thinking about images, or 
particular kinds of images, in contrary directions. On one 
common division, world traces itself mechanically in 
photographs, whereas mind expresses itself through painting.1 
Scholars of photography disavow such crude distinctions: much 
recent writing attends in detail to the materials and processes of 
photography, the agency of photographic artists, and the social 
determinants of the production and reception of photographs. As 
such writing makes plain, photographs cannot be reduced to 
mechanical traces.2 Yet background conceptions of photography 
as trace or index persist almost by default, as no framework of 
comparable explanatory power has yet emerged to replace them. 
A conception of photography adequate to developments in 
recent scholarship is long overdue. Rather than constructing 
such a conception top–down, as philosophers are wont to do, 
this paper articulates it by examining selected works by James 
Welling.3 There are several reasons for this: Welling’s practice 
persistently explores the resources and possibilities of 
photography, the effect of these explorations is to express a 
particular metaphysics of the mind’s relation to its world, and 
appreciating why this metaphysics is aptly expressed by 
exploring photography requires a revised conception of what 
photography is. In as much as it provides a framework for a 
richer interpretation of Welling, the new conception is also 
capable of underwriting a wide range of critical and historical 
approaches to photography. 
 
Prologue: Aluminum Foil 
Welling’s artistic breakthrough came in 1980 with a series of 
silver gelatin contact prints of 4 × 5″ Kodak Tri-X negatives 
depicting aluminium foil. Taken as a whole, Aluminum Foil 
constitutes a remarkably resolved and uncompromising early 
artistic statement. Though, technically speaking, the prints could 
have been produced any time during the previous hundred years, 
they would have been hard to anticipate prior to their creation, 
given the many norms of photography they seem happy to 
forgo.4 Pictorially, they are difficult to resolve. They have an 
unrelenting, ‘all-over’ quality, appearing harshly lit yet very 
dark – an effect achieved by over-exposing in camera to secure 
sufficient density of detail in the shadow, then over-exposing 
again when printing to bring out that detail.5 Instead of the 
glittering array of reflections that one might associate with 
crumpled foil, one finds expanses of black or deep shadow 
punctuated by febrile highlights. Commentators often call these 
works ‘abstract’, but this description needs to be qualified. It 
may not be obvious what they depict, but all can be seen as 
depicting something, and that something turns out to be 
crumpled foil filling the surface from edge to edge (plate 1 and 
plate 2).  
Even so, Aluminum Foil resists familiar modes of 
engaging with photography. Nothing in them marks a horizon. 
Only indentations, ridges, and crevices relieve the shallow 
space. Natural phenomena are suggested: rocky surfaces laced 
with crevices, turbulent seas, impenetrable foliage, even dense 
cloud, but nothing so much as the surface of an alien, lifeless 
planet. The sensation is not one of looking out into a landscape 
oriented to the upright posture of a human body, into which one 
might imaginatively project oneself, but of looking down onto 
an unyielding topography that frustrates the eye’s ability to 
explore it. One can more easily imagine hovering over such a 
surface, than walking through it. The dominant mood is one of 
suffocating airlessness. David Salle described Welling’s early 
work as ‘pure death wish’.6 
Shaping the series is an engagement with materials that 
can be traced all the way back to Welling’s pre-CalArts training 
in painting and sculpture. Consider the manipulation of foil. 
Something has taken place off camera that these photographs 
record, something ‘hands-on’ (plate 3). The work is expressive 
rather than cool, but its expressiveness is restrained and pivots 
almost entirely on minor variations between images. Indeed, the 
depth of self-restraint and refusal to emote evinced by these 
images is responsible for their emotional force. But it is not only 
foil that has been manipulated here. Light has also been 
controlled, as much through the foil’s reflective properties as by 
camera and enlarger.7 Control of light is a recurring theme of 
Welling’s work, in both his camera-less darkroom practices and 
his lens-based photography. In Aluminum Foil, Welling’s 
parsimonious rationing of light yields images that are pictorially 
hard to read – claustrophobic, lacking identifiable space, depth, 
or orienting reference points. Early on Rosalind Krauss drew 
attention to Welling’s tendency – contrary to the presumed 
nature of photography – to ‘hold the referent at bay, creating as 
much delay as possible between seeing the image and 
understanding what it is of’, and Welling has often spoken of his 
desire to overload his images, making them dense and difficult 
to decipher.8 
Who could have predicted, from looking at Aluminum 
Foil, the large, intensely coloured photograms of plumbago 
blossoms radiating light, generated from scratch in the darkroom 
(Flowers, 2004–7, 2011, 2014)? Or the dazzling, sometimes 
jarring, studies of Phillip Johnson’s Glass House filtered and 
reflected through coloured gels, diffraction gratings, and mirrors 
(Glass House, 2006-9)? Or the small, gestural abstractions 
printed in cliché verre from paint on mylar as a counterpoint to 
Susan Howe’s Frolic Architecture (2010)? And how do any of 
these gel with the straight black and white series, such as 
Connecticut Landscape (1998–), Railroad Photographs (1987–
1994), or Light Sources (1977–2005)?  
This diversity calls for an account of what Welling is up 
to. The resolute manipulations of the materials, processes, 
conventions, and norms of photography is hard to miss. Just as 
obviously, Welling’s manipulations engender powerful effects. 
Critics have remarked on both, yet a puzzle remains.9 Every 
artist seeks a consonance between means and ends: a choice of 
means opens up a range of ends, just as a particular end inflects 
the use of means. The puzzle is to understand the relation 
between Welling’s exploration of photographic resources, on the 
one hand, and his interest in diverse expressions of the self’s 
relation to its world, on the other. Solving this puzzle in 
Welling’s case requires articulating a new conception of 
photography that illuminates Welling’s interventions in various 
stages of the photographic process. That done, a question arises 
as to what Welling’s explorations of photography reveal about 
his work’s substantive and thematic concerns. But the new 




Welling’s oeuvre invites philosophical reflection because it not 
only raises the question of what photography is (and has been), 
but also the question of what photography might be. Of course, 
much photography invites theoretical reflection, where ‘theory’ 
deals with what particular forms of photography mean or do in 
particular contexts of production and reception. The philosophy 
of photography, by contrast, attempts to articulate what 
constitutes photography – what might be called its fundamental 
‘nature’.10 The enterprise is easily caricatured as a quest to pin 
down an immutable essence insensitive to cultural or historical 
context, but it need not be regarded in this way. Philosophical 
conceptions of photography are better understood as tools for 
counterfactual thinking – for imagining photography’s 
possibility space, and for thereby appreciating all that can be 
done to make images by means of photography. By persistently 
exploring the resources and possibilities of photography from 
the inside, Welling is arguably doing philosophy by other 
means. Each of his series offers a practical demonstration of 
some hypothetical photographic possibility. 
If this is what Welling is up to, it only pushes the 
interesting question back a step: for why is he interested in 
doing that? Welling’s explorations are not formal experiments 
conducted for their own sake; each series draws attention to a 
particular emotional inflection of the self’s relation to its world. 
Seen as a whole, Welling’s oeuvre is a vehicle for expressing a 
wide-ranging metaphysics of mind and world. The conception 
of photography proposed here is intended not only to make 
sense of that general project, but to illuminate selected series 
within it.  
Looking beyond Welling, one finds that criticism and 
theory of photography often harbour philosophical assumptions, 
more or less implicitly. Take sensitivity to counterfactual 
possibility: any artistic gesture – whether deliberate or aleatory 
– is meaningful only when viewed against an implied 
background of other possible gestures. Just as obviously, the 
meaning of an interpretation is situated in a space of alternative 
possible readings. Background assumptions about what 
photography is capture what is possible in the medium and 
generate the counterfactual spaces within which criticism takes 
place. The lesson is not that theory cannot proceed without 
philosophy. It typically does. It is rather that those moments 
when philosophy emerges from the background, as it does when 
prompted by Welling, repay attention. 
On default conceptions, photography is understood as a 
mechanical process for producing ‘natural’ signs that (typically) 
resemble their causes. These conceptions of the photograph as 
an essentially passive trace or imprint of its referent, akin to the 
fingerprint, death mask, or footprint in the sand, systematically 
obscure the significance of practices such as Welling’s. The 
problem is not that Welling’s photographs do not incorporate 
material traces of the world; the problem is that we cannot get 
far in appreciating what Welling is up to so long as we focus 
narrowly on those features of his photographs that token the 
registration of light. Being told that the Aluminum Foil 
comprises a series of traces, imprints, or indices, for example, 
misses almost everything of interest about them – certainly 
anything that might explain their aesthetic appeal or their 
significance as art.  
For all their manifold differences of emphasis and 
methodology, default conceptions of photography commit, 
implicitly, to a view of the medium as essentially receptive – 
more passive than active. Susan Sontag’s Bazinian reflections 
on photographs as ‘direct impressions’, ‘material vestiges’, or 
‘stencils’ of the real is an obvious example.11 Sometimes 
photographic receptivity is expressed through a metaphysics of 
self-generation, as in Henry Fox-Talbot’s infamous claim that 
Lacock Abbey was the first building ‘that was ever yet known to 
have drawn its own picture’.12 On Fox-Talbot’s reasoning, it has 
to be the building that inscribes itself, through the action of 
light, on the sensitive surface because photographic agency is 
natural, not human.  
Roland Barthes implicitly conceives of photography as 
receptive in a similar way when he characterizes the ‘punctum’ 
as the unintended but affecting marginal detail that is revealed in 
the photograph, despite passing unnoticed by the photographer. 
So construed, the punctum is possible for Barthes precisely 
because the photograph records what was there, no matter what 
might have been of interest to the photographer. The same 
implicit commitment to receptivity is echoed in Barthes’s more 
general claim that the noeme of photography is ‘that-has-
been’.13 Likewise, C. S. Peirce characterizes photographs as 
‘indexical icons’ – images whose resemblance to their sources is 
a result of a distinctive process that ensures ‘point by point’ 
correspondence to their sources. Peirce’s examples may be 
divided into two broad kinds: the index as trace or residue of its 
cause (the footprint in the sand, ashes in the grate), and the 
index as indication, ostention, or deixis that requires the co-
presence of its referent to flesh out an otherwise empty 
designation (the pointing finger, the linguistic shifters, ‘I’, ‘you’, 
‘look!’ ‘that’).14 Barthes ‘noeme’ brings them together: that 
(index as ostention) has been (index as trace).15 
Rosalind Krauss, whose work on the index from the late 
1970s was hugely influential for art theory’s inheritance of these 
ideas, conceives photography in broadly similar terms when she 
presents it – drawing freely on Barthes and Peirce – as a natural 
rather than conventional mode of imaging. Barthes’s ‘message 
without a code’, conjoined with a Peircian view of indices as 
traces or residues of their causes, becomes Krauss’s ‘physical 
manifestation of a cause’.16 Much as ‘the natural world […] 
imprints itself on the photographic emulsion’, so the 
surrounding environment is ‘merely registered’ by the kind of 
site-specific installation about which Krauss was then writing.17 
The conception of photography underlying this account would 
have been recognizable in its essentials to Joseph Nicéphore 
Niepce, Louis Jacques Mandé Daguerre, and William Henry 
Fox-Talbot, for all that Krauss is putting it to quite different 
uses.18  
Despite their manifold (and manifest) differences, and for 
all that they mean different things in different contexts, these 
writers implicitly concur in viewing photography as more or less 
passively recording the world.  
Until recently, philosophers were also united in 
conceiving of photography as essentially receptive.19 Obviously, 
the photographer must decide what to photograph and select a 
suitable vantage point, she must choose a camera, lens and film, 
determine what will be in focus and how to frame and expose 
the scene. After the fact, she may again exert control, either in 
the darkroom or through a software application. But all this 
takes place either before or after the moment of exposure. So 
long as the shutter is open, the mapping of features from scene 
to light-sensitive surface depends solely on camera and lens. 
Because the recording event is not itself under the agent’s 
control, photographs are visual traces: they cannot but register 
whatever is in front of the camera, subject to the camera 
variables applied. 
A new generation of philosophers has broken with this 
consensus.20 While they acknowledge an ineliminable moment 
of photographic receptivity, they also emphasize photographs’ 
material origins. In this, they take their inspiration from the 
process-first approach proposed by Patrick Maynard in The 
Engine of Visualization. Maynard objected to the widespread 
tendency to ‘consider photography in terms of its products, 
photographs, and then… consider some significant relationship 
that these products bear to some other thing or things’.21 What 
constitutes a photograph is not some special relationship 
photographs bear to their objects; what makes something a 
photograph is its genesis in a photographic process. Because 
Maynard himself stops short of characterizing the elements of 
this process, the question becomes: what is a photographic 
process? 
The new conception builds on Maynard’s idea that 
photography is a process by proposing that any photographic 
process has (at least) four stages, each of them an event.22 The 
first is a pro-photographic scene, a worldly happening before a 
photographic apparatus. (So not any bit of the world is a pro-
photographic scene; its being such depends on the presence of 
the apparatus itself.) Second is the formation, by the 
photographic apparatus, of a dynamic light image, a two-
dimensional pattern of light that changes over time in concert 
with changes in the pro-photographic scene. The light image is 
not an artifactual image: in most (if not all) cases, it occurs 
inside the camera but it is not typically visible there (the camera 
obscura is one exception). Stage three is a ‘photographic event’, 
properly so called, where information contained in the light 
image is recorded, either chemically or electronically.23 Even at 
this stage, there is no artifactual image – that is, no image made 
to be displayed or amenable to visual appreciation, because 
nobody can see the pattern of silver halide compounds in an 
emulsion or charged and non-charged states of metal-oxide 
semi-conductors in a CCD. A fourth stage of mark-making 
(broadly construed) is required before there is an image that can 
be visually appreciated. Printing with photosensitive emulsion 
or inkjet, projecting slides, or displaying pixels: photography 
exploits a rich and diverse family of technologies for rendering 
marked or patterned surfaces suitable for visual appreciation. 
Importantly, though, none of them is uniquely photographic and 
none suffices on its own to generate a photograph. 
The new conception, building upon Maynard, has several 
merits. It redirects attention from product to process, which it 
takes to be a technology for making marked or differentiated 
displayable surfaces, leaving out no part of the photographic 
process. The moment of receptivity reduces to the photographic 
event, a bit of base-level causation where photons emitted or 
reflected by an object modify the electrical states of 
semiconductors or silver halide molecules. Unlike conceptions 
of photography as fundamentally receptive, which stop here, the 
new conception includes the pro-photographic scene, the 
dynamic light image, and various processing and mark-making 
technologies as genuine constituents of photography. Because 
all four stages are necessary for making an image that can be 
visually appreciated, none can be excluded from the domain of 
photography ‘proper’. As a corollary, the photographer acts 
within the domain of the ‘strictly photographic’ whenever she 
intervenes in any one of the four stages. 
On this conception, an image counts as photographic so 
long as it implicates a photographic event in its causal history. 
This is photography’s ineliminable moment of receptivity, but 
the new conception shrinks it to a point. Beyond this point, both 
before and after it, the new conception opens up the space of 
photographic possibility, prompting us to attend to the many 
means photographers employ to mobilize photography’s causal 
substrate, the registration of a light image, in the service of their 
artistic ends. By contrast, conceptions that over-burden 
receptivity tend to treat photography as a black box. Welling’s 
practice takes the lid off this box and, in doing so, demonstrates 
the range and malleability of the photographic process. 
  
Work in Process 
Welling’s work is often viewed in terms of oppositions such as 
camera-less versus lens-based, abstract versus representational, 
analogue versus digital, or colour versus black and white. But 
the fluidity with which Welling moves between and across such 
categories suggests that parsing the work in this way misses 
something crucial about what he is doing. The new conception 
makes sense of the unity of Welling’s practice, by understanding 
it in terms of a broader photographic process and possibility 
space that individual series thematize in diverse ways, 
depending on where in the photographic process Welling most 
prominently invests his agency. 
Aluminum Foil focuses attention on the pro-photographic 
scene. As in much of Welling’s work from the early eighties 
(Phyllo (1980) and Drapes (1981), Gelatin (1984) and Tile 
Photographs (1985)), the photographed scene is not found as–is, 
but is constructed from the ground up. Despite any initial 
obstacles to deciphering what one is looking at, photography is 
figured across these series as recording whatever is in front of 
the camera at the moment of exposure, just as default 
conceptions would have it. While the new conception accepts 
that the camera records whatever is before it, it also proposes a 
conception of the photographed scene as pro-photographic, an 
essential stage of the photographic process itself. In Aluminum 
Foil, the scene cannot be understood as independent of the 
photographer’s agency and intervention, because it has been 
constructed with the camera in mind. If the practice can still be 
understood in terms of ‘the document’, it is a document of a 
very peculiar kind – a document of what the photographer has 
done, off camera, with an eye to the camera that will record it. 
The vision of an independent, extra-photographic reality 
recedes: it fails to capture how the camera can be a condition not 
only of recording reality, but of the pro-photographic scene 
itself. Had there been no camera to record it, the scene would 
not have existed.24  
Contrast Aluminum Foils with the later Glass House series 
(2006-9) (plate 4). The pro-photographic scene is now Philip 
Johnson’s Glass House set in the Connecticut landscape. But 
Welling’s focus is no longer on constructing the scene; instead 
he undertakes to disrupt the light image that the scene casts on 
his camera’s sensor, using what he declares to be a unique 
technique.25 Whereas digital post-production permits precise 
control, filters interrupt the optics of the camera in ways that are 
hard to predict.26 Glass House’s colour effects were obtained by 
handling coloured gel, plastic, and glass in front of the camera 
during exposure. In the standard trope, Welling’s camera 
doubles the house, which is a single room, or camera, and a lens 
onto the landscape – or a Claude Glass.27 Yet this cannot be the 
whole story, for it applies equally to any photograph of the glass 
house, and so misses the particularity of Welling’s interventions 
in the formation of the light image. 
That we are being asked to attend to the particularities of 
Welling’s way of rendering the Glass House is intimated by 
various subtle tells in the images. Looking closely, one can 
make out Welling, with camera and tripod, reflected in several 
of the head-on images (such as 0467, 2009) (plate 5). This is 
one of the rare occasions where Welling appears in his own 
work.28 It suggests that Glass House strives to embody 
something of his own experience of the place as he photographs 
it. Welling’s handling of filters and glasses is a performance; 
indeed it is highly improvised. The series displays the kind of 
unexpected variation that comes with improvisation, and thereby 
draws attention to the presence of the performer. Welling 
confirms, ‘when I am there, I am keenly aware that just being 
there is an event. The filters in a strange way amplify and 
double that being there’.29 The point is worth pursuing. By 
showing himself reflected with camera in a glass house that is 
itself a camera in the landscape, Welling identifies his own 
images’ ‘failure’ of legibility with the house’s failure to tame 
the landscape into a series of discrete views. 
Welling’s procedure in Flowers (2004–7) is quite 
different. At first blush, what these images show may seem 
obvious. Though their colour effects are difficult to resolve, they 
seem to depict some kind of foliage, with a hint of strong sun 
irradiating the edges (plate 6 and plate 7). Yet the series poses 
an even greater challenge to default conceptions of photography. 
For in this case there was not even a worldly scene to record, if 
that is understood to require something prior to and independent 
of the camera. Rather, a pro-photographic scene has been 
created ex nihilo in Welling’s darkroom, which has itself 
become a camera that Welling steps inside, so as to work 
directly on the photographic event.  
The multi-stage process that leads to Flowers begins with 
making a photogram, a camera-less contact print generated by 
selectively occluding a light-sensitive surface exposed to light. 
Photograms are one of the oldest photographic methods, going 
back to Fox-Talbot’s 1830s camera-less images of lace and 
leaves. Where Fox-Talbot used the sun, Welling uses the bulb of 
the enlarger. That aside, Welling’s photograms are made in an 
entirely traditional way. Objects are laid directly onto a light-
sensitive surface, which is then exposed to light. Occluded areas 
of the surface remain unchanged, areas exposed to light blacken 
when developed. In Flowers, however, that surface is film rather 
than photographic paper. 
The resulting film photograms are then used as negatives 
to make prints with an enlarger in the standard way. In effect, 
Welling is creating negatives from scratch in his darkroom, 
without the aid of a camera. The film negatives (the original 
photograms) are black and white. Colour is added later, during a 
second print stage, by sandwiching coloured gels in the 
enlarger’s mixing box. Light, originally filtered by the opacity 
of the flowers occluding the film, is filtered for a second time by 
the gels so that semi-transparent tones of grey register as 
colours. Where the blossoms directly touched the film during 
the original exposure, no light will have penetrated (assuming 
they are opaque) leaving the film clear. Where they were merely 
close to the film, some light will have penetrated, producing 
delicate, gauzy greys – and the same will be true of anything 
less than fully opaque, such as translucent petals. Filtering light 
through coloured gels transforms these greys into hues. Because 
the original film images are negatives, solid shapes are rendered 
negatively in clear, unexposed film; at the print stage these clear 
areas allow light to pass freely, resulting in positive images of 
flowers in the form of coloured light. 
It cannot be correct, as one critic writes, that the Flowers 
are ‘a stunning vehicle with which to capture and represent [the] 
actual subject: light phenomena’, as this would make the flowers 
merely instrumental to the depiction of light.30 Light is equally a 
vehicle for the flowers, and the point generalizes. While the 
challenge of the photogram, to use objects to modulate light, 
may appeal to an interest in abstraction, it is just as much the 
challenge of photographic representation more generally to use 
objects to modulate light and thereby depict them. Light is both 
subject and vehicle. 
Consider what is gained by adding colour to monochrome 
images. In everyday life, flowers are quintessentially coloured 
objects, classic tokens of beauty.31 Welling’s Flowers operate in 
a different register. Evoking the experience of dappled sunlight 
beneath trees, this is not an everyday depiction of flowers as 
nature morte; it images beauty in a much deeper sense. Welling 
welcomes a characterization of them in terms of ‘presentness’, a 
being at home in the present, rather than dwelling on time, 
absence, or loss.32 Flowers express sheer joy in the world’s 
visible presence and the sun’s gift of light. They are the 
antithesis of Aluminum Foil. Where light struggles to penetrate 
the lifeless, suffocating world of the foils, here it overflows to 
the point of irradiating the image. 
Something else about Welling’s process in Flowers is 
easily overlooked but sheds light on his practice as a whole. The 
original photograms are made on 400 ASA Kodak Tri-X film. 
The film’s sensitivity to all visible light precludes the use of a 
red safety light while exposing the photograms in the darkroom. 
Any light would fog the film. So the choice of film over paper 
necessitates that the photograms be arranged in total darkness, 
generating a complex interplay of activity and passivity in the 
making of Flowers. Welling exercises his agency in setting up 
the process and its parameters but must surrender control at the 
moment of execution. Though Welling can work by touch in the 
dark, it is only once the enlarger light is tripped, exposing the 
film to light – only when it is already too late – that he sees the 
pattern of foliage he has placed on the film, and is able to form a 
determinate visual impression of how the final image might 
look. At the crucial moment, he is photographing blind. 
Doing so demands an openness to fortuitous accident.33 
Meeting this demand indicates Welling’s confidence that the 
world will meet him half way. Call such openness ‘trust in the 
world’. Stronger than a disposition, it is an ability: it requires 
self-possession to suspend doubt for long enough to find out 
where blind avenues may lead. Some will see this as a generic 
artistic virtue – one that befits any artist who wishes to produce 
something new – and there is much to said for this view. But 
Welling's self-possession can also be seen as peculiarly 
photographic, for no image depends more directly on the world, 
one might think, than a photograph. Photographers rely on input 
from the world in a direct and concrete way, even if they are not 
constrained by it in all the ways that conceiving photography as 
a purely receptive affair would have us imagine. Being a 
photographer involves knowing what to do with, and how to 
respond to, what the world provides. Different kinds of 
photography no doubt mobilize this know-how in different 
ways, and at different stages of the process; but whenever a 
process involves trial and error, the photographer must rely on 
know-how and past experience to indicate the directions likely 
to prove profitable for exploration. At the crucial moment, 
Welling may be photographing blind, but the making of Flowers 
is anything but floundering: the set up is tailor-made to solicit 
the fortuitous accident, the quirk of circumstance or process, 
that prevents Welling falling back into the trap of the tried and 
tested. 
As Aluminum Foil, Glass House, and Flowers (three out of 
more than sixty series listed on Welling’s website) suggest, 
Welling draws on resources at every stage of the photographic 
process.34 We see the staging and construction of the pro-
photographic scene in Aluminum Foil. The landscape in Glass 
House is fashioned by redirecting the flow of light with mirrors 
and filters before it enters the camera, thereby impacting the 
formation of the light image. And the camera is often left behind 
altogether to direct the photographic event in the darkroom, as 
in Flowers. The idea that photographers insert themselves into 
the photographic process primarily by screening light is brought 
out in numerous ways, not limited to the selective occlusion of 
light, the use of more or less reflective or absorptive materials, 
and the iterated use of colour filters and gels. Baffles and 
screens of various kinds proliferate. Optical artefacts abound – 
not only lens flare but moiré patterns. Every imaginable print 
technology is used, from straight silver to inkjet, from one-stage 
printing to more than three, from 4 × 5″ contact prints to large 
scale, from traditional to hybrid technologies that move freely 
back and forth between analog and digital, colour and black and 
white. Welling is well aware that his practice implies a 
capacious conception of the medium: ‘I’m interested in finding 
new ways of applying materials to a surface…. Photography is 
just a different way of applying material and some of my works 
draw out this process’.35  
Although important, such technical considerations are 
only one dimension of Welling’s practice. A fourth series allows 
us to revisit those already considered, with a more direct eye to 
their expressive content and emotional valence. In Frolic 
Architecture (2010), Welling rejoins a longstanding, if often 
implicit, project to use the resources of photography to express 
the significance of history for individual lives. His stance does 
not reduce history to temporal distance, the ‘that-has-been’ of 
photographic cliché. It is more solicitous, even as it concedes its 
own limits and the impossibility of containing the past in the 
present without remainder. It distills a sense of what might be 
called the ‘deep present’. 
Frolic Architecture is a set of ten photograms made to 
illustrate a poem of the same title by Susan Howe (plate 8 and 
plate 9).36 The process builds on the one developed for Water 
(2009), where Welling immersed sheets of Chromogenic paper 
in water and exposed them to light prior to developing them. 
Prolonged soaking frees up the water-soluble blue die in the 
surface of the paper. By exposing the paper to light, Welling 
causes the paper to record an image of its own surface at the 
moment of exposure. In seeing the resulting picture, one is 
seeing a prior semi-liquid state of the very surface one is 
looking at. It is hard to imagine a more direct reminder of the 
labour of photography; these images demand that the viewer pay 
attention to what has taken place – to what the photographer has 
done – to generate the surface they are currently seeing. Leaving 
no room for doubt, Frolic Architecture adds a layer of manual 
performance to the process: Welling folds sheets of mylar and 
contact prints them to silver gelatin paper. Contact printing is, as 
the name suggests, laying one surface (typically a negative) onto 
another (typically a sheet of photographic paper), holding the 
two flat with a sheet of glass and exposing to light, thereby 
producing an inversion of the negative on the print. In this case 
the ‘negatives’ are hand-rendered: Welling adds paint before or 
after folding the sheets of mylar, until they are rendered opaque, 
such that no light can pass through them to form an image. The 
resulting images are scanned and inkjet printed, before being 
bound into books. 
With Frolic Architecture, there is a direct connection 
between how the work has been made and its content, a 
connection that is thematized within the work itself. Its making 
echoes the work of both Howe and her principal sources, the 
New England revivalist theologian Jonathan Edwards and his 
sister Hannah Edwards Wetmore, who kept a diary in the 1730s 
on large folio sheets folded into small panels. Books are made 
from the same folded sheets, the folds cut away to leave pages. 
Howe’s poem sequences collages of photocopied text that she 
snips, twists, and tapes onto the page. When read aloud, snippets 
of visible text become phoneme fragments that ventriloquize the 
past in an elusive voice, as though one were overhearing 
fragments of a conversation that only just reaches the threshold 
of intelligibility.37 Combined with Howe’s text, Welling’s 
images recall his earlier photographs (taken in 1977–86) of 
pages of his own great-great-great grandparents’ travel diaries 
from their grand tour in 1840–41 (plate 10).38 Some pages are 
shown in full, some partially, some highlight the elegance of the 
script, the deep black ink, the texture of the paper. Many include 
pressed objects or slips of paper, material fragments of stops 
along the tour. In both series, the handling of materials forges a 
link to the material, if fragmented, reality of the Edwards and 
the Dixons – in the case of Welling’s painterly images, the 
expressive gesture summoning up the script of his forbears.  
Unlike portrait photography, which figures subjectivity as 
autonomous and self-contained, Frolic Architecture and 
Diary/Landscape represent it metonymically and partially, 
through its material traces. Domestic rather than heroic, the past 
self bleeds into the present through barely overheard snatches of 
conversation, fragments of script, dried flowers and other 
mementos. This is not some simple exercise of recollection; 
instead, the material traces of past subjectivity are 
rematerialized through the workings of photography. We are 
reminded just how much photography involves the handling of 
physical materials in addition to the screening and control of 
light. Contrary to expectations, abstraction here embodies, in 
muted form, the afterlife of the historical by means of the 
material processes of photography.39  
Frolic Architecture and Diary/Landscape attend, in 
different ways, to the afterlife of the past in the present, thereby 
distilling a sense of the presence’s depth. Flowers suggests a 
welcoming of the present moment, a ‘being-in-the-present’ 
rather than a dwelling on absence or loss. Yet Aluminum Foils 
and Glass House suggest something much more equivocal. 
Aluminum Foils seem to wall up space in such a way as to 
emphasize the impenetrability and obduracy of the depicted 
world. These are alien, inhuman spaces, grave-like 
environments devoid of oxygen or light. Where Flowers 
suggests a free welcoming of the world, these early works are 
their inverse.  
The idea of being – or not being – at home in the world is 
a latent theme of Welling’s work more generally. Johnson’s 
Glass House is in Connecticut, where Welling grew up and his 
family history runs deepest. Several of Welling’s apparently 
more straightforward series, not considered here, have 
documented aspects of the Eastern seaboard, including its 
railways and architecture. But if Connecticut in some sense 
signifies ‘home’ for Welling, then it operates in his work more 
as an idea or beacon than as a physical location. It signifies what 
it might mean were we able – and we are not – to close the gap 
between mind and world.  
For much of the modern aesthetic tradition, to find 
something beautiful is itself to feel at home in, or at one with, 
the world in a metaphysically significant way. Natural beauties 
such as flowers – perhaps precisely because they are fleeting – 
have traditionally functioned as classic tokens of such 
significance. In Immanuel Kant’s foundational version of this 
thought, the distinctively cognitive, rather than merely sensory, 
pleasure afforded by beautiful nature hints that the natural world 
may ‘favour’ us in some way. To find nature beautiful is to 
come across something that strikes us as so suited to the 
interaction and attunement of our most fundamental sense-
making capacities that it seems as if – but only as if – it were 
designed for that very purpose. In this way, natural beauty 
intimates that, despite nature’s potentially bewildering 
complexity, our epistemic and moral goals of making systematic 
sense of it and acting freely within it may not be in vain. The 
subjective qualification is crucial: the thought concerns how 
human beings are constrained to view nature, in so far as they 
aspire to make systematic sense of or act freely within it. The 
claim is not about how nature is in itself, which is something 
that we cannot know and should not pronounce upon, lest we 
fall back into the sense-transcending claims of speculative 
metaphysics. Nonetheless, the unexpectedness and sheer 
welcome of this intimation is grounds for pleasure. This is what 
Kant means when he calls beauty ‘subjectively purposive’: the 
kind of cognitive stimulation it affords is suited to furthering our 
most basic epistemic and moral projects.40  
Assuming that this Kantian thought articulates what it 
would mean, metaphysically, to feel ‘at home’ in the world, 
Glass House suggests that the feeling can only be approached 
asymptotically, through a series of partial, disorienting views. 
Pulsating with colour and jarring superimpositions, Glass House 
hardly suggests harmonious, contemplative repose. Instead, light 
throbs and colour is overwhelming: sometimes stifling, 
sometimes blinding or bone-chilling, sometimes jumpy, 
nervous, and edgy – always ‘visually intoxicating’.41 Welling’s 
description of the series as an analytic decomposition of vision 
into its trichromatic channels is potentially misleading: for it 
leaves out how the channels are made to interfere with each 
other, subverting the optical legibility of which Johnson’s Glass 
House is an icon. Reflecting materials held before the camera 
layer and rearrange the landscape in ways that are impossible to 
resolve. In 9818, 2009, for example, the sun on the 
photographer’s back reappears above the house so as to 
transform the entire landscape, and not just that bit of it that falls 
within his camera’s field of view (see plate 4). The images seem 
to capture an experience of the world as resisting the mind’s 
organization of sensation into a coherent, cognitively well-
ordered reality – an experience that William James described as 
‘one great blooming, buzzing confusion’ cognitively prior to 
‘our location of all things in one space’.42 The ideology of the 
glass house as an architectural type is that it tames and 
interiorizes its site by turning it into a series of vistas. As 
Johnson famously quipped: ‘Nature is the most expensive 
wallpaper’. In Welling’s Glass House, by contrast, the 
Connecticut landscape is a force that cannot be contained, but 
always outstrips the order the house seeks to impose. In 
Jamesian terms, it outruns the synthetic powers of mind, for 
which the house – itself a camera – serves as a metaphor or 
analogue. Unlike Johnson’s Glass House, Welling’s is closer to 
James’s experience of refusal, breakdown, and perpetual 
deferral of legibility and sense. 
 
Photography, Mind, and Self 
How does re-conceptualizing photography help us to understand 
Welling’s practice as it has been presented here – as both rich in 
formal, technical experimentation, and thematically dense and 
complex? On any conception that would identify photography 
with an event of transcription, much of what Welling does may 
be ‘photographic’, or perhaps ‘photographically derived’, it 
cannot be photography, strictly speaking. For the same reason, 
any thematic, emotional, or intellectual concerns that Welling 
addresses by intervening in the pro-photographic scene, the light 
image, or post-recording processes will by necessity reside 
outside the domain of photography. Welling’s concerns might 
explain why he does what he does, but they cannot explain what 
makes what he does photography, as long as photography is 
conceived as a mode of receptivity – an essentially natural (non-
agential) registration of a light image, akin to the footprint in the 
sand. The revised conception proposed here represents 
photography much more capaciously, revealing Welling’s 
exploration of diverse photographic materials and processes to 
be a coherent exploration of a unified domain of photographic 
possibility.  
 Aluminum Foil, Glass House, Flowers, and Frolic 
Architecture involve different stages of the photographic 
process. To what end does Welling explore this space of 
photographic possibility? Granted, he thematizes the richness of 
the photographic process. But why? Can the new conception 
also help us bring out a unity at the level of his expressive and 
poetic concerns? His more perceptive critics acknowledge the 
traces that such concerns have left in his work, but to date have 
done little more than label them – as ‘aching beauty’ and 
‘vulnerability’, or the ‘sensuous’ and ‘sheerly aesthetic’.43 
Moreover, these labels leave mysterious the connection between 
Welling’s passion for materials and processes and the deeper 
metaphysical and poetic concerns of his work. An adequate 
conception of photography needs to do more than merely 
fencepost the boundaries of a technology; it has to equip us to 
investigate what can be done with it. Refusing to treat it as a 
black box, Welling understands the camera as an apparatus 
engineered over centuries to produce a coherent image of the 
world in accordance with a highly specific set of pictorial 
conventions: 
 
You have the history of image-making always on 
the surface of any photograph you make. All these 
technicians made all these decisions about what 
kind of light rays will be rendered on this material 
surface. When you take a piece of chalk and a piece 
of paper, no one is telling you what to do. But 
photography is so specific about what can be 
rendered… that specificity is something that I have 
always found exciting.44 
 
By drawing attention to what it is and is not possible to render 
photographically, and its history, Welling equates photographic 
processes in general (and not merely the camera) with the 
synthetic, ‘sense-making’ capacities of mind.  
A central tradition in modern philosophy, originating in 
Kant and continuing into contemporary philosophy of mind, 
takes the basic problem of mind to be one of clarifying the 
relation between ‘spontaneity’ and ‘receptivity’.45 The relation 
is between the conceptual structure spontaneously imposed by 
mind on matter provided by the world. Both are conditions of 
coherent experience: spontaneity is a condition of making sense 
and receptivity is a condition of experience having some content 
to make sense of. According to this tradition, the spontaneous 
mind ‘synthesizes’ (constructs, combines, brings together) 
coherent experience of an objective world from passively 
received external input. Developed as a tool for standardized 
imaging, the camera itself is a supreme example of spontaneity: 
it builds the synthetic powers of cognition into the apparatus 
itself. But photographic spontaneity transcends the camera; it 
pervades any use of photographic materials to make sense of the 
stimuli received from the world. Taken as a whole, Welling’s 
oeuvre not only shows us this sense-making in action, but also 
where it breaks down.  
This conception of photography as an achievement of 
representation reverses the standard picture of photography as 
pure receptivity, a process for passively recording appearances. 
Yet spontaneity always runs up against what is outside itself, 
given that experience is not a product of mind all the way down. 
For just this reason, exploring the realm of photographic 
possibility limns the boundaries of spontaneity. In Welling’s 
work, states of heightened emotion dramatize the self’s attempts 
to make sense of its world. A vertiginous world induces the 
stifling confinement of the Aluminum Foils and the buzzing 
profusion of Glass House. Flowers capture the joy of being in 
the present moment, while Frolic Architecture mines the present 
for the fragmentary echoes of the past. 
But Welling’s individual projects do not merely present 
the constitutive relation between mind and world impersonally, 
by using photographic materials and processes as an analogy for 
the world-constructing, sense-making powers of mind. Though 
this is a concern of Welling’s work as a whole, his more 
powerful series catalyze a particular mood or feeling to embody 
the experience of an individual, empirical self as it tries to make 
sense of its world. This requires careful unpacking. The relation 
between self and world is neither Welling’s subject-matter nor 
his work’s thematic content, if that is taken to mean what it 
depicts. His images depict a broad swath of things, and some of 
them do not depict at all. Rather, various possible relations of 
self to world are enacted through Welling’s explorations of the 
resources of photography. 
Photography, Welling’s practice implies, is at root a 
relation between two terms – not only photograph and world, 
but also photographer and world. Photography’s medium is the 
screening of light at some stage of making an image, plus the 
manipulation of various materials and image-rendering 
processes. Light is not only a condition of photography, but also 
its limiting threat. Without at least one light exposure there can 
be no photograph, but too much or too little light, or the right 
amount but at the wrong time, and the image will be fogged or 
destroyed entirely.46 If photography is a relation between a 
photographer and world, and light is the medium of that relation, 
then Welling’s manipulation of light acknowledges the 
vulnerability of the human individual to the twin prospects of 
being overwhelmed (over-exposed or flooded) by the richness of 
what the world has to offer or of being under-nourished (under-
exposed, under-developed) by the paucity of what it provides. 
The surfeit of light in Flowers and the poverty of light in 
Aluminum Foils – the one irradiating to the point of eating away 
the image, the other being sucked away into darkness – express 
these twin possibilities. Other series, such as Light Sources, 
occupy a middle ground of equanimity, even attentiveness and 
openness to whatever the world presents to view. 
It is important to see that the relation between a priori 
mind, empirical self, and world operates at two distinct levels 
throughout Welling’s practice. At the level of his practice as a 
whole, the persistence with which Welling mobilizes the diverse 
resources of photography draws attention to the relation between 
mind and world at an impersonal, constitutive level. By making 
use of such a broad range of processes, including (but not 
limited to) camera-based operations, his oeuvre foregrounds the 
constitutive, sense-making dynamic of mind and world per se. 
At the level of the individual series, however, the work 
thematizes a variety of psychological responses to the empirical 
self’s dependence on its world. At this level, it is no longer some 
impersonal or constitutive relation between mind and world that 
is at stake – it is Welling’s.  
This may explain the seam of ‘recessive autobiography’ 
that seems to permeate many of Welling’s projects, in much the 
same way as the metaphysics of home and its vicissitudes, from 
the fleeting appearance of his face in the early student work 
Film (1971) to his occasional reflection with camera and tripod 
in Glass House, including the allusions in many series to family 
and personal history. This persistent, if recessed, aspect of 
Welling’s practice intimates that photography comes not from 
the resources of photography conceived impersonally, but from 
an individual photographer’s way of interacting with light, 
materials, and processes. 
Conceptions of photography as receptive make no room 
for any of this because they effectively shrink what makes a 
depiction photographic to an event of transcription. Shrinking 
photography to the transcription event in this way may isolate 
what distinguishes photography from other forms of depiction, 
but it also ensures that whatever photographic artists do, they do 
outside of the domain of photography, strictly speaking. It 
unacceptably curtails the prospects for understanding 
photographic art if we must think that the very activities that 
make photographs art cannot also be the ones that make them 
photographs. The conclusion can only be that they are art, 
despite being photographs. Not so on the new conception: they 
are art at least partly because they are photographs.  
<Line Break> 
By his own admission, at the outset of his career Welling 
cultivated an aesthetics of opacity, density, and difficulty, which 
he equated with ‘subjectivity, style, and gesture’.47 In doing so, 
he embarked on a way of making photographs that put, and 
continues to put, photographic agency centre-stage. 
Photographic agency is not simply acting by means of making 
photographs, though traditional thinking about photography has 
a hard time granting even that.48 It is an agency enacted within 
the space of photography, a space that turns out to be much 
more capacious than is often supposed, at the point where the 
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